








Invertebrate animals are usually seen as a kind of “aliens” which do not deserve 
any moral consideration. However, there is a growing amount of evidence 
indicating that many of them do have the capacity to experience pain. The same 
criteria that are usually applied in order to infer that vertebrates are sentient 
beings (behavioral response, learning capacity, memory, a certain specific 
neurophysiological structure…) lead to the idea that many invertebrates are 
sentient as well. Therefore, under the skeptical premise that we have no direct 
evidence of the experience of pain in vertebrates, we are forced to hold that it 
exists in both vertebrates and invertebrates.  
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Introduction1 
Invertebrates represent between 90% (Horvath et al., 2013) and 99% (Carere et 
al., 2011) of the species of the animal kingdom, and their number in terms of 
individuals is much higher than that of vertebrates. Invertebrates include 
several types of phyla, such as arthropods (including insects), mollusks such as 
cephalopods, nematodes, or echinoderms. However, the question whether they 
should be morally considered is rarely addressed. Although the number of 
works related to this issue has increased over the last years (see, for example: 
Lockwood, 1988; Crook & Walters, 2011; Broom, 2013; Tomasik, 2016 [2015] or 
Knutsson, 2016), the moral consideration of invertebrates is still an important 
field of animal ethics which remains largely unexplored. The main reason for 
this seems to be the relatively widespread view of invertebrates as a kind of 
“aliens” (Lockwood, 2014). Due to this, they are seldom seen as beings with 
interests, and when they are, there is a tendency to think that those interests do 
not deserve any consideration. Nevertheless, an increasing amount of research 
supports the view that invertebrates, or at least a large part of them, have the 
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capacity to experience pain. Thus, if the capacity to have positive and negative 
experiences or, in other words, sentience, is accepted as a criterion of moral 
consideration, then we should extend moral consideration to some invertebrate 
animals.  
To address this issue, Section 1 will clarify the two main concepts that should be 
considered in order to assess whether invertebrates can suffer, namely, 
nociception and pain. Section 2 will show the fundamental problem that arises 
when it comes to attributing any kind of subjective experience to other 
individuals, that is, that there will never be any direct proof for its existence. 
The problem of solipsism, therefore, forces us to appeal to indirect evidence, 
such as behavior. Thus, lest we display a speciesist prejudice, the same criteria 
for the identification of sentience needs to be applied to individuals of different 
species. Section 3 will present the criteria which can be used in order to infer 
that, if the experience of pain is attributed to other vertebrates, it should also be 
attributed to invertebrates. The moral relevance of the experience of pain will be 
dealt with in Section 4. Finally, it will be concluded that there are solid 
arguments to claim that at least a large number of invertebrates have the 
capacity to experience pain and, hence, moral consideration should be granted 
to them. 
 
1. Nociception and the experience of pain 
Several factors need to be considered to address the question whether 
invertebrates suffer. It is relatively uncontroversial that nociception is one of 
them. As defined by Smith, nociception is “the capacity to detect and respond 
to noxious or aversive stimuli” (1991: 26); that is, beings with nociception are 
endowed with a sensory system which allows them to react to external threats 
by showing reflex movements. An example is the violent reaction, aimed at 
evasion, of insects when a needle at high temperature is moved closer to their 
antenna (Wigglesworth, 1980).  
The presence of nociception has been established in invertebrates such as snails 
(Wigglesworth, 1980), fruit flies (Tracey et al., 2003), earthworms (Elwood, 
2011), leeches (Broom, 2013), mollusks (Crook & Walters, 2011), octopuses 
(Mather, 2001), or nematodes (Wittenburg & Baumeister, 1999). In fact, as 
Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) defend, nociception was even present in the 
“Cambrian Explosion” in vertebrate ancestors. However, as Mather (2001) 
clarifies, nociception is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence 
of subjective experiences in general, and for the experience of pain in particular. 
In fact, nociceptive responses may even occur without subjective experience in 
the case of human beings (Crook & Walters, 2011).  
Pain has been defined as “an internal awareness, coupled with a negative 
emotional state or feeling, that results from perception of actual or potential 
tissue damage” (Elwood, 2011: 176). In this sense, pain produces suffering as a 
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negative experience for the subject who feels it. Due to this, on those occasions 
when suffering is dealt with in this work, the possibility of experiencing pain 
will be assumed. However, it should be clarified that pain and suffering are not 
two necessarily coimplicated phenomena. While all pain involves a certain 
amount of suffering, it does not happen the other way around. Not all suffering, 
understood as a “negative emotional state” (Morton & Hau, 2002: 459), entails 
the experience of pain. 
Pain implies not only a behavioral reaction to noxious stimuli, but an awareness 
of those stimuli. Although both have an evolutionary purpose, that of 
behavioral reactions to noxious stimuli is to protect the individual from 
immediate damage, while developing awareness of noxious stimuli helps to 
protect the individual from hypothetical future damage. The latter would be the 
result of the conjunction of memory with learning about the ways to avoid 
situations which caused the original pain (Bateson, 1991). Nevertheless, the 
presence of nociception does not necessarily entail the presence of 
consciousness, even though it suggests it. Other indicators that allow the 
attribution of subjective experience to an individual will be examined in this 
paper. Prior to that examination, it is necessary to deal with one of the key 
premises on which the argument this paper defends rests. 
2. The problem of the attribution of subjective experiences 
The problem of the attribution of subjective experience could be outlined as 
follows: we cannot be absolutely certain about how others feel their own mental 
experiences (Nagel, 1974), or about whether these experiences exist at all 
(Hyslop, 2014 [2005]). Because of this, although most of those who deal with the 
issue of invertebrate sentience assign it to human beings, this is ultimately 
beyond demonstration (Ng, 1995: 270). Understanding that, sentience 
presupposes some degree of consciousness, since it is the capacity to have 
positive and negative experiences (Lockwood, 1988). In this paper, sentience is 
equated with phenomenal consciousness as “the qualitative, subjective, 
experiential, or phenomenological aspects of conscious experience, sometimes 
identified with qualia” (Allen & Trestman, 2016 [1995]). 
Therefore, if the problem of solipsism is taken as a reference, only experimental 
and theoretical criteria can be used as a basis for the assumption of subjective 
experiences in other entities (Lockwood, 1989). Faced with the impossibility of 
“entering” the mental contents of other minds, a third-person methodological 
perspective is required (Dennett, 1991). Thus, the criteria considered in this 
paper will be neurophysiological and behavioral evidence. Merely the fact of 
belonging to one species or another cannot constitute a guideline per se to 
assume that the criteria to assess whether some beings are sentient vary 
depending on the species (Horta, 2010a). 
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In relation to the aforementioned problem of solipsism, we find the well-known 
“argument-by-analogy” (Sherwin, 2001), a first argument developed to 
determine which entities have subjective experiences. According to it, if a 
particular behavior is observed as a result of an electric shock in a mammal and 
we infer that this individual felt pain, for example, then ceteris paribus we 
should make the same inference in the case of those invertebrates who react in 
an analogous way: “we should either reject the argument by analogy for both or 
accept for both” (Elwood et al., 2009: 129). This criterion should not be 
conclusive, however, as it is possible that some animals feel pain without 
expressing it (see Dawkins, 2001). For instance, from the fact that a Spartan 
warrior did not express pain, the inexistence of such pain cannot be deduced. 
Therefore, even though behavior can be an indicator of sentience, other criteria 
need to be considered in order to infer which individuals possess subjective 
experiences.  
3. Criteria to attribute subjective experiences  
Because the study of animal cognition has been addressed by different 
disciplines, this article focuses on the two most representative criteria. These 
criteria are the observational, followed for example by ethologists, and the 
neurophysiological, followed by psychologists (Andrews, 2016). In addition to 
what has been said in Section 1, considerations about the behavioral criterion 
will be included in section 3.3. 
 
3.1. Neurophysiological structure 
 
Barron and Klein (2016a, 2016b), as well as Merker (2007), argue that the most 
basic kind of consciousness is caused by the activity of human midbrain and 
basal ganglia. This is backed by the cases of patients who have some degree of 
consciousness after suffering serious cortical damage, as well as by experiments 
linked to anesthesia (Barron & Klein, 2016b). Rather than the “phenomenal 
consciousness”, from which the experience of pain emerges (Barron & Klein, 
2016b), self-consciousness would be the kind of awareness associated with the 
cerebral cortex (Damasio, 1999). Apart from Barron and Klein, or Merker, other 
authors, such as Damasio & Carvalho (2013) and Mashour & Alkire (2013), have 
supported this idea in several works. Despite the differences between the 
neurophysiological architecture of vertebrates, which have midbrain, and the 
brain of invertebrates, the existence of a functional analogy between them is 
possible. Thus, for example, provided that a function of the midbrain in 
vertebrates is the integration of sensory information for the sake of spatial 
orientation, this same function is carried out by the nervous system of insects 
(Barron & Klein, 2016a, 2016b). As in vertebrates, there is evidence that this 
spatial configuration by insects implies certain subjectivity, considering that the 
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filtering of sensory information is selective depending on the relevance that this 
may have for the choices made by the subject, as in the case of bees (Paulk et al., 
2014). The spatial representation of the environment is, therefore, “subjective” 
and “egocentric” in both vertebrates and invertebrates:  
As we have argued, processing of this kind supports the capacity for a subjective 
experience of the environment. Processing in the insect brain is unified to a similar 
degree, for similar reasons. Hence, we propose that the insect brain can also support a 
capacity for subjective experience (Barron & Klein, 2016a: 8). 
The existence of natural opioids and analgesics in the nervous system of 
invertebrates is another neurophysiological type of proof for their possession of 
subjective experiences, specifically pain (Knutsson, 2016). It is known that 
natural opioids have the function, among others, of modulating pain in order to 
reduce the way it is felt (Elwood, 2011). For this reason, Rollin says that “the 
very existence of endogenous opiates in animals is powerful evidence that they 
feel pain” (1998: 154). Earthworms constitute an example of invertebrates who 
have been reported to possess natural opioids (β-endorphins and enkephalins) 
whose goal is directly related to the regulation of pain (Lockwood, 1987; Smith, 
1991), particularly as analgesics. Similarly, the artificial injection of another kind 
of analgesics, like morphine, produces an analogous effect in vertebrates and 
invertebrates. Generally, this effect is expressed with behaviors such as a lesser 
effort to avoid the sources of pain, as shown in snails (Kavaliers et al., 1983). 
Related to the similarity between the physiological changes associated to the 
experience of pain in vertebrates and invertebrates, we can also emphasize 
pupil dilatation, changes in blood and respiration flow rates, and stress or 
relative changes in the endocrine system (Elwood et al., 2009; Elwood, 2011). In 
the light of this evidence, some researchers have already claimed the use of 
analgesics and anesthetics in research with invertebrates (Lockwood, 1987, 
1988; Crook & Walters, 2011). 
3.2. Common origins 
 
As it has been defended by Feinberg and Mallatt (2016), the origin of 
consciousness dates back to the "Cambrian Explosion" that occurred 
approximately 500 million years ago. Although the first vertebrates, which had 
a complex nervous system, began to emerge at that time, they did not appear 
spontaneously. Vertebrates and invertebrates (namely, arthropods), share a 
common bilaterian ancestor (a type of worms). According to Feinberg and 
Mallatt, predation is the main reason why arthropods (as predators) and 
vertebrates began to evolve independently: "During the Cambrian explosion, 
two of the most mobile clades of animals followed this path of ever improving 
sensory systems: the arthropods and the vertebrates" (2016: 64). Thus, although 
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the greater genetic potential of vertebrates, their "genomic quadrupling" (2016: 
67), was the difference with respect to the evolution of invertebrates; the reason 
for the emergence of consciousness is explained, in both vertebrates and 
invertebrates, by the sensorial improvements. 
 
3.3. Cognitive capacities 
 
It has been already discussed that the evolutionary usefulness of pain 
experience does not seem to be other than making individuals remember it so 
that they can avoid possible sources of painful experience in the future 
(observably, it can also be useful to avoid a source of pain immediately). In 
order to achieve this aim, both memory and the capacity to avoid the source of 
pain are necessary. As a result, only those entities that have such characteristics 
may be sentient, given evolutionary logic. 
Memory has been extensively investigated in some invertebrates such as bees 
(Menzel et al., 2005), which are able to configure a mind map of their 
environment, to communicate about it ─ through their well-known “dance” ─ 
and to make deductions from it (Carruthers, 2007). Sømme says in his report on 
the sentience and pain in invertebrates that “after three visits to a source of 
sugar, a foraging bee will remember the place forever” (2005: 25). Additionally, 
the mnemonic abilities of other invertebrates, such as cephalopods, have been 
documented (Mather, 2001).  
Closely related to memory there is the ability to escape from a source of harm. 
In the case of crustaceans, some experiments have shown how crabs can 
recognize the sources of negative experiences suffered in the past. In one of 
these experiments, after moving the crabs from a dark to an illuminated 
compartment they receive an electric shock. After one minute they are returned 
to the dark compartment. With only one trial, the crabs are unwilling to return 
to the illuminated compartment after 3 hours (Elwood et al., 2009). When they 
have undergone this process several times, the crabs display this behavior until 
up to 24 hours later. Similar investigations have been carried out with fruit flies 
(Yarali et al., 2008), cockroaches or ants (Broom, 2013), and lobsters (Elwood et 
al., 2009). The results of this research concerning memory and pain-avoidance 
learning provides solid reasons to conclude that, if we accept that vertebrates 
experience pain, the same must be concluded in the case of at least some 
invertebrates. 
 
3.4. Some objections 
 
The conclusion presented above has met with criticism from some authors due 
to the physiological differences between humans and invertebrates. The small 
size of the brains of invertebrates, as well as the simplicity of their nervous 
system, are often mentioned as arguments against it.  
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Human brains may have around 86 billion neurons (Azevedo et al., 2009), 
which may be more than 100,000 times more neurons than certain insects 
(Tomasik, 2016a [2015]). Bees, which are among the insects with greater 
neuronal systems, have approximately only one million neurons (Menzel & 
Giurfa, 2001). Hence, if there is a proportional relationship between brain size, 
or number of neurons, and consciousness, then it will be true that the above 
conclusions are incorrect. It would be hard to believe that invertebrates, 
especially smaller insects, can be conscious of pain and thus experience 
suffering.  
However, the existence of a necessary relationship between the size of a brain, 
or the number of neurons per se, and the complexity of its functioning is unclear 
(Broom, 2003; Tomasik, 2016a [2015]; Barron & Klein 2016a). As happens in the 
case of bees, very small brains can produce complex behaviors, such as their 
famous dance. In fact, studies such as the one carried out by Chittka and Niven 
(2009) argue that what really matters when it comes to assess the capabilities of 
a brain are neural circuits, and not so much the mere size. These authors 
suggest that a greater number of neurons in certain regions of the brain can 
produce a variation in their functioning, for example in the sensory systems. 
However, from the previous assertion it cannot be inferred that brains with a 
lesser neuronal density cannot develop these functions.  According to these 
studies, each neuron of an insect could work as a kind of "supercomputer" 
(Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016: 184), equating its potential with several vertebrate 
neurons. In consequence, there is no proportional relationship between brain 
size and ability to be conscious. As Darwin said, "due to the wonderfully 
diversified instincts, mental powers, and affections of ants," the brain of one of 
them "is one of the most marvelous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more 
so than the brain of man.'' (Darwin, 1871, qtd. in Chittka & Niven, 2009: R995). 
In the same vein, it has also been argued (see, for example, Walter, 1983) that 
invertebrates cannot be conscious as they lack a central nervous system like the 
one of vertebrates. However, this objection can be questioned since the same 
function can be caused in different individuals with divergent morphologies 
(see Lockwood, 1988). Just as the possession of an identical visual system to that 
of humans is not a conditio sine qua non for the attribution of the sense of sight 
to other individuals, including invertebrates, neither does the central nervous 
system have to be completely homogeneous (Elwood, 2011). 
Thus, to summarize, the following criteria for the attribution of the experience 
of pain to other entities, including invertebrates, have been considered here: i) 
the presence of nociception, together with its behavioral responses, and ii) the 
possession of a suitable neurophysiological structure. Related to these criteria 
are: iii) the effects derived from opioids; iv) the possession of certain cognitive 
capacities, such as memory and pain-avoidance learning, and v) the common 
origins of consciousness.  
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The aforementioned objections, in addition to that one which highlights those 
behaviors of invertebrates which do not adapt to painful experiences, seem to 
lead towards a different understanding of the experience of pain in 
invertebrates in relation to vertebrates. Some examples are grasshoppers, which 
continue to feed despite being devoured by a mantis, or insects which are not 
perturbed by the amputation of one of their limbs (Smith, 1991). We are talking 
about the degree and way in which these experiences occur. Thus, it should be 
acknowledged that the arguments provided against the named objections only 
underpin the existence of consciousness in invertebrates, namely the experience 
of pain, but do not provide information about either the way in which it is 
produced, or the degree of its intensity. For these reasons, it should be accepted 
that the previous objections compel us to talk about consciousness in some 
invertebrates in a weak sense; that is, as possessors of a “primary 
consciousness”, “I consciousness” (Barron & Klein, 2016b), or “phenomenal 
consciousness” (Block, 1991). In addition, the above criteria do not allow 
attributing that consciousness to all invertebrates, but only to some, mainly 
arthropods and cephalopods.2 On the contrary, some others, like sponges, do 
not seem to fulfill any of these requirements, so they constitute a type of 
invertebrate without consciousness. Despite this, the conclusion it can be drawn 
from this section remains valid. There are solid reasons to hold that, if the 
experience of pain is conferred to vertebrates other than ourselves, it must also 
be conferred to some invertebrates. 
 
4. The ethical relevance of suffering 
 
Most animal ethicists have argued that the capacity to feel pain is at least a 
sufficient condition −if not a necessary one, as well− for moral consideration 
(Singer, 1975; Regan, 1983; Sapontzis, 1987; Pluhar, 1995; Francione, 2000; 
Cavalieri, 2001; Dunayer, 2004; Horta, 2010a). At this point it should be clarified 
that, although pain is an extremely effective mechanism for survival, this is 
completely external to its relevance as a criterion for moral consideration. This 
difference can be seen with an example: someone can be thankful for the 
experience of the pain produced in his hand because this makes him aware of 
the fact that he is resting that hand on a burning board. But the "moral utility" 
of such suffering lies in the fact that it avoids even greater pain. In the same 
way, it may be correct to inflict a certain pain on a subject, for instance by 
pulling a tooth, as long as it avoids a greater pain. If the moral relevance of our 
acts lies in the positive or negative effects that they will have on other 
individuals, and whether they could be sentient due to this, then acts that affect 
sentient beings must be morally relevant. If this is understood this way, we will 
realize that every sentient being must be morally considered, which implies that 
 
2 One of the works cited (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016) comes to a similar conclusion. 
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their interests must be taken into account directly, not in an instrumental way 
(Bernstein, 1998).  
Given the nature of positive and negative experiences, we do not usually 
believe that both can be taken symmetrically (Griffin, 1979). This idea is 
supported by those who defend a negative consequentialism theory. It is highly 
counterintuitive to think that the suffering experienced in Auschwitz, for 
example, by a Jew, could be compensated by some amount of future pleasure 
(Pearce, 2010). It is also counterintuitive that somebody could consider positive 
the creation of happy beings, either two (Tomasik, 2016b [2015]) or an 
indeterminate number (Longueira, 2011), in exchange for the creation of one 
who experiences extreme suffering during all their lifetime. This idea could also 
be supported by taking the “Law of Hedonic Asymmetry” of Frijda (1988) as a 
reference. According to it, negative experiences are characterized by their 
greater degree and temporal persistence with respect to positive ones, which 
tend to disappear quickly. 
As a result, among other reasons, of the reproductive strategy followed by 
invertebrates, predation or parasitism (Faria, 2016), an enormous number of 
invertebrates which are born have only the opportunity to have negative 
experiences (Horta, 2015). Therefore, from the perspective of negative 
consequentialism, a first ethical measure to reduce the suffering of invertebrates 
is to prevent their birth. A successful measure of this type implemented, 
although not for the reasons stated above, consists in the release of mosquitoes 
with low reproductive capacity whose very few offspring will also have these 
difficulties for reproduction (Zheng et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the realization of 
such measures for ethical purposes should always be preceded by a scrupulous 
study about the consequences that will occur in the short, medium and long 
term, which is not a simple task. 
Nevertheless, due to the current social and cultural context, there is a normative 
prescription prior to the previous one, which is the overcoming of speciesism. 
As long as this does not happen, no action (such as the one already mentioned) 
will be carried out in a way which has strong repercussion. Beyond these two 
measures, there are some others that should be considered, such as feeding 
from invertebrates (Tomasik, 2016c), or the use of materials such as silk 
(Tomasik, 2016d). Ultimately, in view of what has been seen in this paper, we 
must avoid prima facie any practice that could harm invertebrates. 
As it has been shown above, although the degree and way in which painful 
experiences are felt is unclear, the ethical implications of their existence remain. 
As argued by Horta (2010b) and Knutsson (2015), even if we consider that the 
degree of sentience of insects is lower than the one of mammals, this possibility 
could not be a minimis risk (Knutsson, 2015). An important reason for this is the 
large number of individuals who could be in this situation.3 Even if the 
 
3 Without considering the rest of invertebrates with the capacity to experience pain, it is estimated that 
there are between 1018 and 1019 insects on the planet (Horta, 2010b; Knutsson, 2015). 
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suffering of mammals was significantly stronger than that of insects, the 
incredible number of the latter would balance the suffering felt by the first ones. 
Consequently, there is a moral duty to take this into consideration, and act in 
accordance with the suggestions mentioned above. 
Conclusion 
If we accept that vertebrates have the capacity to experience pain, then the 
available evidence strongly indicates that it should be accepted in the case of 
many invertebrates. The inability to access the minds of others forces us to 
consider indirect criteria alone, such as neurophysiological or behavioral 
criteria. As previously mentioned in this paper, numerous studies show how 
the neurophysiological structure of some invertebrates, such as insects or 
cephalopods, can produce the phenomenal consciousness necessary to 
experience pain. The behavior of many of these arthropods or mollusks 
reinforces this idea. However, by virtue of these criteria, we cannot attribute 
consciousness to other invertebrates, such as those belonging to the phyla of the 
Polifera (sponges). Either way, although the degree in which pain is 
experienced by invertebrates is unclear, the total number of invertebrates in the 
world means that their suffering is a huge ethical problem. This is due to the 
fact that belonging to particular species cannot be taken per se as a reason for 
discrimination, in a similar way to what happens with gender or skin color. A 
moral differentiation between distinct beings can only be made on the basis of 
non-arbitrary criteria. Following the premises which are usually accepted by 
animal ethicists, this paper has focused on the consequences that are more 
rarely remarked, which are the duty to grant moral consideration to 
invertebrates, as well as all the need that the moral agents that take this moral 
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